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I. INTRODUCTION 
On Monday, January 28, 2013, a group of eight United States 
(“U.S.”) senators introduced a “Bipartisan Framework for 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform” (“Bipartisan Framework”).1 In 
asserting that the United States immigration system is “broken,” the 
senators offered a plan aimed at, inter alia, “creating a tough but fair 
legalization program for individuals who are currently here [that will] 
ensure that this is a successful permanent reform to our immigration 
system that will not need to be revisited.”2 This model for 
immigration reform, proposed by Senators Schumer, McCain, 
Durbin, Graham, Menendez, Rubio, Bennet, and Flake included four 
“basic legislative pillars.”3 The focus of this Article is one of these four 
legislative pillars of immigration reform: that aimed at creating “a 
tough but fair path to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants 
currently living in the United States . . . .”4 This Article uses the 
analytical frameworks found in literature on policy innovation and 
nondecision making to explore whether the comprehensive 
immigration reform set forth in the Bipartisan Framework amounts 
to policy innovation or nondecision.5 
According to the literature on policy innovation, policies 
adopted as “new” by an individual or aggregation of individuals are 
viewed as innovations.6 The key is not whether the idea is new as 
measured by the interval in time since its first use or its invention; 
rather, it is whether the person or persons adopting the idea perceive 
 
*Adjunct Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law and Associate 
Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri-St. Louis. 
1  Senators Schumer, McCain, Durbin, Graham, Menendez, Rubio, Bennet, and 
Flake, Bipartisan Framework for Comprehensive Immigration Reform (Jan. 28, 2013), 
available at , http://www.flake.senate.gov/documents/immigration_reform.pdf 
[hereinafter Bipartisan Framework]. See also Julia Preston, Senators Offer a Bipartisan 
Blueprint for Immigration, N.Y.TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/us/politics/senators-agree-on-blueprint-for-
immigration.html?_r=0. 
2   Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 1.  
3  Id.  
4  Id. 
5  See generally Lawrence. B. Mohr, Determinants of Innovation in Organizations, 
63AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111 (1969) (discussing policy innovation); Peter Bachrach & 
Morton S. Baratz, Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework, 57AM. POL. 
SCI.REV. 632 (1963) (discussing nondecisions). 
6  See generally EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSIONS OF INNOVATION 12 (5th ed. 2003).  
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it or deem it as new. In the particular context of immigration law, 
policy innovation refers to the adoption of problem-solving 
approaches that depart from traditional legislative approaches 
regarding regulation of immigration.7 
The argument in this Article is that the Bipartisan Framework’s 
plan to create a pathway to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants 
will not amount to policy innovation, but will instead reflect 
nondecisions by Congress resulting from the contentious nature of 
immigration reform and the resulting electoral stakes involved.  
Nondecisions are the absence of substantive decision making outputs 
that, in the context of legislation, result from a concerted effort by 
policy gatekeepers to keep “really pressing problems inherent in post-
industrial American democracy off the political agenda by controlling 
what [is], and what [is] not, ‘legitimate’ to raise in government fora.”8 
The nature of nondecisions in the legislative arena has been 
adequately characterized by Francis Lee, a professor of government 
and politics at the University of Maryland, who stated the following: 
Nondecisions occur in congressional agenda setting when 
rank and file members willingly acquiesce in party leaders’ 
authority or in legislative strategies developed in 
consultation with fellow partisans. Nondecisions also occur 
when members adjust their own actions in anticipation of 
what their party leaders and fellow partisans will support. 
These nondecisions take place for a variety of reasons, 
including members’ electoral stakes in their parties’ 
collective policy performance, their individual desires to 
move up through their party’s ranks by “going along to get 
along,” their susceptibility to peer-group pressures exerted 
by fellow partisans, and their inclination to support the 
party line as a default position in the absence of contrary 
inclinations.9 
This Article argues that genuine reform of the United States 
immigration system will require a distinct departure from current 
and past U.S. immigration policies in order for such policies to be 
 
7  Id. 
8  A. E. Keir Nash, In Re Radical Interpretations of American Law: The Relation of Law 
and History, 82 MICH. L. REV. 274, 324-25 (1983). 
9  Francis Lee, Agreeing to Disagree: Agenda Content and Senate Partisanship, 1981–
2004, 33 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 199, 201-02 (2008) (internal quotations omitted).  
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innovative. Reform will require an approach that abandons old 
policies and introduces a new and improved course of action. 
Analyzed through this lens, it is clear that this portion of the 
Bipartisan Framework suggests that Congress will restate and revisit 
past Congressional policies, some of which remain in effect as 
codified in various sections of the federal law. Overall, this signals 
that Congress will promulgate policies cloaked in reform-oriented 
propaganda, but that are in reality nondecisions reflecting the strong 
degree of electoral uncertainty resulting from the polarizing nature 
of immigration policy. Such nondecisions are a means to avoid the 
potential pitfalls and risks of adopting true policy innovation while 
still maintaining the outward appearance of lawmaking. 
The next section of this Article discusses the literature on policy 
innovation and nondecisions in the context of immigration 
policymaking. From there, the six major elements of the first pillar of 
the Bipartisan Framework, which relate to a pathway to citizenship 
for unauthorized immigrants already presented in the United States, 
are analyzed. After listing the six elements of the first pillar of the 
Bipartisan Framework, each element is analyzed by discussing how 
federal law already approaches or has historically approached 
addressing the stated legislative goal. This Article argues that the 
proposed plan suggests Congress will not innovate by adopting new 
immigration policies that are a departure from current immigration 
policies. Rather, the Bipartisan Framework suggests that Congress will 
restate and revisit immigration policies that are presently codified in 
various sections of federal law. This Article argues that the failure to 
adopt substantively new approaches towards regulating unauthorized 
immigration is a reflection of nondecision making by Congress. 
II. THE UTILITY OF THE LITERATURE ON POLICY INNOVATION 
AND NONDECISIONS FOR ANALYZING PROPOSED 
IMMIGRATION REFORM 
Lawrence Mohr, Professor Emeritus of political science and 
public policy at University of Michigan, in a seminal work on policy 
innovation, states that innovation can be measured by the extent to 
which actors “adopt and emphasize programs that depart from 
traditional concerns.”10 According to Mohr, the concept of innovation 
 
10  Mohr, supra note 5, at 111. 
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is defined as “the successful introduction into an applied situation of 
means or ends that are new to that situation.”11 Mohr argues that 
innovation tends to be a function of three major factors: (1) the 
motivation to innovate, (2) the strength of obstacles against 
innovation, and (3) the availability of resources for overcoming such 
obstacles.12 Frances Stokes Berry and William D. Berry, two of the 
leading scholars in the field of policy innovation, likewise point out 
several factors that influence policy innovation.13 According to Berry 
and Berry, social, political, and economic factors, as well as internal 
organizational factors, can affect whether decionmakers ultimately 
decide to innovate or maintain the status quo.14 
The framework set forth by Mohr, Berry, and Berry can be used 
to explain the lack of federal immigration policy innovation. The 
following section sets forth a number of examples to support this 
argument and to illustrate how the presence of these factors will 
impede congressional immigration initiatives and result in 
nondecisions. 
Nondecision making in the lawmaking process is the antithesis 
to policy innovation. The literature on nondecision making is an 
outgrowth of the seminal work of Peter Bachrach and Morton S. 
Baratz, which focuses on the nature of community power and the 
characteristics of decision making versus nondeicison making.15 While 
many scholars have employed Bachrach and Baratz’s analysis to 
investigate agenda control and decision making in various contexts, 
this line of literature is sorely understudied and underemployed as a 
research paradigm in the legal academic field— particularly  in law 
review articles.16 This Article seeks to utilize the discourse on 
nondecisions and policy innovation in the context of lawmaking, and 
 
11  Id. at 112 (emphasis added). 
12  Id. at 114. 
13  See generally Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as 
Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395 (1990). 
14  Id. at 396. 
15  Bachrach & Baratz, surpa note 5 at 632-42.  
     16 To be sure, however, there are a handful of law review articles employing 
Bachrach and Baratz’s nondecision paradigm. See, e.g., Ascanio Piomelli, Foucault's 
Approach to Power:  Its Allure and Limits for Collaborative Lawyering, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 
395, 402 (2004); Murray Edelman, The Construction of Social Problems as Buttresses of 
Inequalities, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 7, 28 (1987); Yoav Dotan, Campaign Finance and the 
Social Inequality Paradox, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM  955,1016 (2003-2004). 
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to demonstrate its utility for understanding how critical decisions in 
the lawmaking realm are influenced by this paradigm. 
One piece of scholarship that does employ the literature on 
policy innovation to examine the role of law and courts in promoting 
innovation is Mark Kessler’s article on legal mobilization for social 
reform.17 Kessler finds that, by manipulating judicial agendas, 
specialized interests are able to effectively constrain the voices of 
policy innovation advocates, such as poverty lawyers seeking to 
mobilize issues of social reform.18 Kessler also notes that legal 
advocates who pressed for innovative changes in policies aimed at 
helping the poor were labeled with social stigmas (e.g., “unpatriotic,” 
“radical,” “rabble rousers,” “trouble makers,” etc.).19 Such stigmas 
undermined these attorneys’ willingness to effectuate change and 
ultimately resulted in nondecisions.20 Kessler points out that 
advocates for change “had no alternative sources of support enabling 
them to resist efforts by powerful local interests to prevent reform 
issues from reaching court agendas.”21 Much like policies aimed at 
helping the poor, rhetoric surrounding immigration reform is so 
polarizing that lawmakers find it more prudent to maintain the status 
quo rather than to innovate, in order to avoid the possible electoral 
implications attached to supporting immigration reform. Indeed, the 
discourse on reform is laden with propaganda that aims to stigmatize 
those who advocate for reform. 
The polarizing nature of immigration reform was illustrated in a 
2007 New York Times article that featured comments by several newly 
elected senators regarding immigration reform.22 For example, 
Senator Jon Tester, Democrat from Montana, stated that opposition 
to a 2007 immigration reform bill came from his constituents of all 
political leanings: “I do hear from my constituents, and I have to tell 
 
     17 Mark Kessler, Legal Mobilization for Social Reform: Power and the Politics of Agenda 
Setting, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 121, 143 (1990). 
     18 Id. at 114. Mohr makes a similar argument is his discussion of obstacles against 
innovation. See Mohr, supra note 5 at 114. 
     19 Id. at 135. 
     20 Id. See also, Mohr, supra note 5 at 114 (discussing motivation, or lack thereof, to 
innovate).  
     21 Kessler, supra note 17, at 138. Mohr makes a similar argument that a lack of 
resources often poses an obstacle to innovation. See Mohr, supra note 5 at 114. 
          22 Carl Hulse, New Senators Resist Overhaul of Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 
2007). http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/28/washington/28dems.html. 
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you it is overwhelmingly do not touch [immigration reform].”23 
Joining in Senator Tester’s reluctance to support the 2007 
immigration bill was Senator Claire McCaskill, Democrat from 
Missouri, who described her constituents’ response to the 2007 bill as 
“‘adamantly opposed’ to the legislation.”24 As evidenced by these 
legislators’ statements, robust constituency disfavor towards 
immigration innovation was an obstacle that weakened motivation to 
adopt immigration policy reform. 
Fast-forwarding to the immigration reform debate on Capitol 
Hill in 2013, not much, if anything, has changed. Despite the fact that 
the Senate passed the Bipartisan Framework as the Border Security, 
Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act in June 
of 2013,25 later that same year the legislation remained mired in the 
web of Capitol Hill partisan politics— in particular, in the U.S. House 
of Representatives.26 
In addition, President Barack Obama opined that blame for this 
lack of action on immigration reform is on internal Republican 
caucus politics.27 It is noteworthy, however, that the arguments of 
lawmakers opposed to the 2013 immigration reform sound strikingly 
similar to those made during the 2007 debates. For example, 
Representative Steve King of Iowa characterized the battle over 
immigration reform as an issue of respect for U.S. law.28 In an 
interview on Meet the Press, King said, “I’ve spent time at the state fair, 
at the Family Leadership Summit yesterday; I’ve been all over my 
district in Iowa, which is 39 of the 99 counties. It is a universal 
message that says, ‘Hold your ground. Keep telling the truth. Defend 
 
     23 Id. 
     24 Alexander Bolton, Conservatives: Public backlash to immigration reform is coming, 
THE HILL (June 1, 2013), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/302893-
conservatives-say-big-public-backlash-to-immigration-reform-is-coming-. 
     25 S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013). 
     26 Ashley Parker, Republicans in House Resist Overhaul for Immigration, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/us/politics/gop-in-house-
resists-overhaul-for-immigration.html. 
     27 Ben Shapiro, Obama Blames Internal Republican Politics for Immigration Reform 
Slowdown, BREITBART (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-
Government/2013/08/09/Obama-Blames-Internal-Republican-Caucus-Politics-for-
Immigration-Reform-Slowdown.  
     28 Id. 
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the rule of law and defend the Constitution.’”29 Many Republican 
members in the House of Representatives “represent conservative 
congressional districts and are not convinced that immigration 
reform represents good policy or good politics.”30 As a result of the 
fear that a critical mass of Congressional Republicans, as well as 
centrist Democrats, have of alienating their conservative voting base, 
many legislators have little or no motivation to promulgate innovative 
immigration reform.31 Steven Camarota, Director of research for the 
Center for Immigration Studies, summarized this position by stating, 
“the Republicans don’t have that much incentive to deal with 
[immigration reform].”32 
Berry and Berry’s thesis that social, political, and economic 
factors affect innovation is similarly applicable in the context of 
immigration reform.33 An investigation by Heather Creek and 
Stephen Yoder on local level efforts to address immigration 
enforcement illustrates how the factors identified by Berry and Berry 
come into play in the immigration policy arena.34 Although the 
policies studied by Creek and Yoder are local in scope, they are 
similar in nature to the federal immigration policy reform studied in 
this Article because they deal with the contentious issue of 
immigration policies aimed at regulating the presence of persons 
unlawfully present in the United States.35 
Creek and Yoder find there are a number of key social, political 
and economic factors that underlie whether a local government 
chooses to adopt Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA”) with the 
 
     29 Steve King, NBC “Meet the Press” - Transcript:  Immigration, VOTESMART (Aug. 11, 
2013), http://votesmart.org/public-statement/802929/nbc-meet-the-press-
transcript-immigration#.UmcLR_Mo7cs.  





     31 See Mohr, supra note 5 at 114. 
     32 Nowicki, supra note 30. 
     33 See Berry & Berry, supra note 14. 
     34 See Heather M. Creek & Stephen Yoder, With a Little Help from Our Feds: 
Understanding State Immigration Enforcement Policy Adoption in American Federalism, 40 
POL’Y STUD. J. 674 (2012). 
     35 See generally id. 
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United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agency 
under § 287(g) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act, which authorizes states to enforce criminal 
immigration laws.36 First, Creek and Yoder find that the political 
leadership of a state has a correlation to the adoption of MOAs.37 In 
particular, states with Republican governors are more likely to adopt 
an MOA allowing local law enforcement to assist ICE in detaining 
violators of national immigration law.38 As far as social variables, 
Creek and Yoder find that an increase in a state’s Hispanic 
population from one year to the next is related to a decrease in the 
likelihood of MOA adoption in the following year.39 With regard to 
economic factors, Creek and Yoder find that states exerting more 
budgetary effort on public welfare are more likely to adopt an MOA; 
in other words, if there is a perception that “immigrants are driving 
up the expenditures on public welfare, then state elites will enact 
legislation intended to reduce that draw on the state budget.”40 
Apart from those identified by Creek and Yoder, other economic 
and social factors have been believed to bear on the immigration 
reform discourse. One such additional economic factor that has been 
identified to affect immigration reform is the weak state of the U.S. 
economy.41 With the U.S. economy in a state of recession and 
unemployment rates rising, American workers may fear that 
unauthorized immigrants will compete with them for jobs, driving 
down wages for labor and depleting new positions created by the 
taxpayer-funded stimulus plan.42 Another social factor affecting 
decisions regarding immigration policy is a significant visible increase 
in the Latino population in locales that have not historically had 
significant populations of such persons.43 The tension that can result 
 
     36 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). 
     37 Creek & Yoder, supra note 34, at 680.  
     38 Id. 
     39 Creek & Yoder, supra note 34 at 684. 
     40 Id. at 685. 
     41 Moira Herbst, Immigration Amid a Recession, BUS. WK. (May 8, 2009), 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/may2009/db2009058_701
427.htm. 
    42 See id; see also Victoria M. Esses, et al., The Immigration Dilemma: The Role of Perceived 
Group Competition, Ethnic Prejudice, and National Identity, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 389, 412 
(2001). 
     43 See, e.g., Rene Rocha & Rodolfo Espino, Racial Threat, Residential Segregation, and 
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from an increase in racial and ethnic minority populations in 
traditionally homogenous white communities can be explained by 
the racial threat hypothesis, under which it is believed that high 
concentrations of minority populations becomes a threat to a larger 
group’s economic and social privilege.44 In addition, some believe 
that an increase in the unauthorized immigrant population is 
accompanied by a spike in the crime rate.45 An additional political 
factor hindering immigration policy innovation is divided 
government, as illustrated by the case of the 2013 debate on 
immigration policy reform. In Congress, Republicans control the U.S. 
House of Representatives, and the Democrats, by a small margin, 
control the Senate.46 As evidenced by the federal government 
shutdown of October 2013 and the acrimonious dialogue between 
the two political parties, it comes as no surprise that Congress has 
been unable to agree on innovative immigration reform policies. 
Francis Lee’s analysis of patterns of legislative conflict between 
the 1980s and the first decade of the twenty-first century has 
significant utility for understanding the effect divided government 
has on immigration policy reform. Lee finds that changes of the 
legislative agenda in the past two decades is to blame for the rise of 
legislative conflict.47 According to Lee, 
The types of issues that were most divisive along partisan 
lines in earlier periods became progressively more 
prominent on the congressional agenda. Meanwhile, issues 
that tended to divide the parties internally in earlier periods 
became a smaller proportion of the agenda. In short, the 
content of the Senate agenda was altered in ways that 
facilitated higher levels of partisan voting.48 
 
the Policy Attitudes of Anglos, 62 POL. RES. Q. 415, 416 (2009); Paul McClain, et. al., 
Racial Distancing in a Southern City: Latino Immigrants’ Views of Black Americans, 68 J. 
POL. 571, 584 (2006). 
          44 Rocha & Espino, supra note 43, at 415.  
          45 Randal C. Archibold, On Border Violence, Truth Pales Compared to Ideas, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 19, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/us/20crime.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
          46 See Composition of Congress, by Political Party, 1855-2015, INFOPLEASE, 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0774721.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2014). 
46 Lee, supra note 9, at 200. 
          47 Lee, supra note 9, at 200. 
          48 Id. at 200. 
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Lee argues that such internal consensus building on issues often 
results in nondecision making.49  According to Lee, “although this 
behind-the-scenes collaboration and consensus building is not visible 
using the methods that empirical social scientists typically use, 
nondecisions profoundly shape the legislative agenda, biasing the 
legislative agenda toward issues that unify the parties internally while 
distinguishing the parties from one another.”50 
The next section of this Article will identify six major elements 
to the first pillar of the Bipartisan Framework, which relates to a 
pathway to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants already present 
in the United States. The Article will then analyze how federal law 
already approaches or has historically approached the legislative goal 
aimed of each element. The Article will also assess whether the 
Bipartisan Framework proposes a substantively new approach towards 
regulating unauthorized immigration, or one that is merely a 
manifestation of nondecision making. 
A. Pillar Number One— A Path to Citizenship for Unauthorized 
Immigrants 
Pillar number one of the Bipartisan Framework, as it relates to a 
path to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants, includes six major 
elements, which are as follows: 
(1) Requiring those who came or remained in the United States 
without Congressional permission to register with the government; 
(2) Requiring unauthorized immigrants to pass a background 
check and settle their debts to society by paying a fine and back taxes 
in order to earn probationary legal status, which will allow them to 
live and work legally in the United States; 
(3) Providing that individuals with a serious criminal 
background or others who pose a threat to national security will be 
ineligible for legal status and subject to deportation; 
(4) Providing that illegal immigrants who have committed 
serious crimes face immediate deportation; 
(5) Requiring individuals with probationary legal status to go to 
the back of the line of prospective immigrants, pass an additional 
 
          49 Id. at 217. 
          50 Id. 
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background check, pay taxes, learn English and civics, demonstrate a 
history of work in the United States, and current employment, among 
other requirements, in order to earn the opportunity to apply for and 
earn lawful permanent residency; 
(6) Providing that individuals who are present without lawful 
status— not including certain childhood entrants and certain 
agricultural workers— will only receive a green card after every 
individual who is already waiting in line for a green card, at the time 
this legislation is enacted, has received their green card.51 
These six elements were likely a result of a compromise in which 
the proposal’s Democratic authors bargained for a pathway to 
legalization for an estimated 11 million undocumented aliens 
presently in the United States, in exchange for tighter border security 
and penalties for those unlawfully present sought by Republican party 
sponsors.52 According to a New York Times article published 
simultaneously to the publication’s release of the Bipartisan 
Frameworks’ details, senate Democrats stated that while they were 
flexible in seeking the bill, “there’s a bottom line, and that’s a path to 
citizenship for the 11 or so million people who qualify.”53 Preston, the 
author of the Times article, described the proposal as an attempt to 
“address the failings of the immigration system in one comprehensive 
measure, rather than in smaller pieces, and to offer a ‘tough, fair and 
practical road map’ that would eventually lead to a chance at 
citizenship for nearly all of the immigrants [in the United States] 
illegally.”54 Notably, the proposal was released one day before 
President Barack Obama’s anticipated release of his administration’s 
proposal for immigration reform.55 
1. Element One— Registration Requirement 
The Bipartisan Framework sets forth a plan to “require persons 
who came or remained in the United States without Congressional 
permission to register with the government.”56 In other words, 
 
          51 Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 1-3. 
          52 See Preston, supra note 2. 
          53 Id. 
          54 Id. 
          55 Id. (noting the date of President Obama’s proposal for immigration reform, 
January 29, 2013). 
     56 Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 2.  
ARTICLE_MIDDLETON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/9/2014  2:06 PM 
2014] COMPREHENSIVE U.S. IMMIGRATION REFORM 325 
 
persons who have entered without inspection (that is, without being 
“admitted”),57 or who have overstayed the terms of their admission 
(“visa overstayers”),58 would be required to affirmatively identify their 
unlawful presence in the United States through some type of 
document. This proposed registration requirement, however, is not a 
novel idea. Federal law already requires all aliens to register their 
presence in the United States.59 The Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”), which requires every alien in the United States who is 
fourteen years of age or older and remains in the United States for 
thirty days or longer to apply for registration and be fingerprinted 
before the expiration of that thirty days, is applicable to aliens who 
have not been admitted into the country.60 Under the INA, willful 
failure to register carries a fine up to $1000 and/or imprisonment for 
a term of no more than six months.61 
Further, the issuance of entry documents, found in Part III of 
the INA, mandates that every alien who applies for a visa “be 
registered in connection with his application.”62 In addition, “no visa 
shall be issued to any alien seeking to enter the United States until 
such alien has been registered in accordance with section 1201(b)” of 
the INA.63 With the advent of this registration requirement, the U.S. 
government has mandated that non-immigrants complete the Form I-
94 (or I-94W for visa waiver entrants).64 This I-94 form records (1) the 
date and place of entry of the alien into the United States, (2) 
activities in which the alien intends to be engaged, and (3) the length 
 
     57 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(13) (2013) (defining the term “admitted” as “the lawful 
entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an 
immigration officer”). 
           58 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (a)(9)(B)(2) (providing that an alien is deemed to be 
unlawfully present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States 
after the expiration of the period of authorized stay). 
    59 8 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2010). 
          60 Id. There is a corresponding requirement that parents register their children 
under 14 years of age. 8 U.S.C. § 1302(b). 
    61 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a). 
          62 8 U.S.C. § 1201 (2010). 
          63 8 U.S.C. § 1301 (2010). 
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of time the alien is authorized to remain in the United States.65 In the 
case of an alien who enters the United States with inspection, but 
overstays the terms of his or her visa, federal law similarly provides a 
scheme in which these persons must be registered.66 Thus, existing 
federal law evidences that Congress has already articulated its policy 
stance that persons who “came or remained in the United States 
without Congressional permission” must register with the 
government.67 On this point, the Bipartisan Framework simply 
restates current law, and does not propose a substantively new 
approach. 
2. Element Two— Background Checks, Fines, and Back 
Taxes 
The second element of the first pillar of the Bipartisan 
Framework is a proposed requirement that unauthorized immigrants 
pass a background check, and pay a fine and back taxes in order to 
earn probationary legal status allowing that a person to live and work 
legally in the United States.68 However, federal law already requires 
non-citizens to undergo background checks in order to obtain 
immigration benefits such as “lawfully present” status.69 
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on American soil, 
the U.S. government (largely through the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security), has increased its usage of 
background checks to screen applicants for immigration benefits.70 
According to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(“USCIS”), a government entity “responsible for ensuring that [the 
U.S.] immigration system is not used as a vehicle to harm our nation 
or its citizens by screening out people who seek immigration benefits 
 
    65 8 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1996). 
          66 Such an alien is a “non-immigrant” because an immigrant visa holder cannot, by 
definition, “overstay.” See 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(A)-(V) (2010) et. seq. (listing the 
various classes of non-immigrants). 
          67 Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 2. 
          68 See id. 
          69 See 8 CFR §103.16; 8 CFR §240.67. See also U.S. CITIZEN AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., 
IMMIGRATION SECURITY CHECKS--HOW AND WHY THE PROCESS WORKS 1 (2006) 
[hereinafter “IMMIGRATION SECURITY CHECKS"] , available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/pressrelease/security_checks_42506.p
df. 
          70 See IMMIGRATION SECURITY CHECKS, supra note 68, at 1. 
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improrperly or fraudulently,” background checks are done “to 
enhance national security and ensure the integrity of the 
immigration process.”71 The USCIS has established a background 
security check process aimed at identifying risk factors that may affect 
an immigrant’s eligibity for an immigration benefit.72  In general, 
USCIS uses three types of background check procedures and retains 
the prerogative to conduct other background investigations as 
needed.73 The background check procedures include (1) the 
Interagency Border Inspection System Name Check, (2) FBI 
Fingerprint Check, and (3) FBI Name Checks.74 Also part and parcel 
of the government’s existing background check process is the 
requirement that persons seeking certain immigrant benefits 
complete the Form G-325A.75 This form facilitates the government’s 
construction of the applicant’s biographical history and provides the 
data needed to conduct a thorough background check.76 Given that 
there is already a legal mandate for immigration background checks, 
the Bipartisan Framework proposes to restate current law and does 
not offer a substantively new approach. 
The Bipartisan Framework’s proposal that persons unlawfully 
present in the United States first attain “probationary legal status” is 
also not a novel approach. Under the Immigration and Reform 
Control Act (“IRCA”),77 a similarly reform-oriented piece of 
legislation signed into law by President Ronald Reagan in 1986, an 
alien first has to acquire “lawful temporary resident” (“LTR”) status 
before he or she can acquire lawful permanent resident status.78 Also, 
 
          71 Id. 
          72 Id. at 2. 
          73 Id. 
          74 See id. 
          75 8 CFR § 103.16 (providing the regulatory basis for requiring the Form G-325A 
for certain applications). 
         76 See IMMIGRATION SECURITY CHECKS, supra note 68, at 1. 
         77 Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) [hereinafter “IRCA”] (amending 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
    78 IRCA § 245A (codified at  § 8 USC 1255a). It is worth noting that the Bipartisan 
Framework uses the term “probationary legal status” rather than “lawful temporary 
resident.” It remains to be seen whether the Bipartisan Framework’s “probationary 
legal status” and all of its inner workings will be tantamount to IRCA’s LTR status. 
80 Pub. L. No. 103-317, 108 Stat. 1724 (Aug. 26, 1994) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1255(i)(1994)). 
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the concept of a paying a fine before a person unlawfully present in 
the United States can embark upon the pathway to lawfully present 
status is in fact not entirely new. In 1994, Congress enacted Section 
245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).79 This 
provision allowed applicants who were otherwise ineligible under 
Section 245, such as by reason of having entered the United States 
without inspection,80 to remain in the United States while completing 
the process of adjusting their status to lawful permanent resident 
instead of having to leave the country to complete consular 
processing.81 A major hallmark of this provision was the requirement 
that the applicant pay a monetary penalty in return for the right to 
remain in the country while completing the adjustment process.82 
While Congress extended eligibility for 245(i) adjustment of status 
benefits when it passed the Legal Immigration Family Equity 
(“LIFE”) Act and LIFE Act Amendments,83 it nevertheless retained 
the penalty structure.84 Today, eligible applicants are required to pay 
a one thousand dollar penalty along with their submission of Form I-
485, Supplement A.85 In light of the penalty structure put in place by 
previous adjustment of status legislation, it is apparent that the 
Bipartisan Framework’s fine requirement restates current 
immigration policy and does not offer a substantively new approach. 
Some argue that the Bipartisan Framework nevertheless contains 
a tougher stance than IRCA.86 For example, IRCA does not require 
undocumented immigrants to pay back taxes to attain lawful 
temporary resident status.87 Thus, the Bipartisan Framework’s 
proposal that undocumented immigrants pay back taxes before they 
 
          79 Pub. L. No. 103-317, 108 Stat. 1724 (Aug. 26, 1994) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1255(i)(1994)). 
          80 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). 
          81 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). 
          82 Id. 
          83 Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000). 
          84 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). 
          85 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 245.10(b). 
          86 See, e.g., Ryan Teague Beckwith, Immigration plan: How 1986 amnesty compares to 
Senate proposal, DENVER POST (Jan. 29, 2013) available at 
http://www.marinij.com/politics-national/2013/01/immigration-plan-how-1986-
amnesty-compares-to-senate-proposal. 
          87 However, the process of applying for LTR status does require the applicant to 
pay a fee.  See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(e)(3). 
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may attain lawful status is an admittedly novel reform. However, while 
it may be the case that the Bipartisan Framework’s back taxes 
requirement is novel, it is nonetheless problematic and paradoxical 
in several ways. First, it presumes that an unlawfully present person 
who seeks to attain legal status has earned taxable income in the past. 
However, the INA makes it unlawful for any person who is an 
“unauthorized alien” to be, inter alia, hired for purposes of 
employment and thus paid wages.88 Assuming the unlawfully 
employed alien has not acquired an Individual Taxpayer 
Identification Number and complied with the federal income tax 
filing guidelines, the government would require evidence that taxable 
wages have been paid to an alien employee and not reported (i.e., 
paid “under the table”). To achieve this goal, either the alien would 
have to self-identify and report taxable income earned but not 
reported to the federal government (potentially exposing the 
employer to civil and criminal penalties under INA Section 274A89, as 
well as I-9 raids), or the employer would have to report to the federal 
government its own unlawful employment practices. Thus, while the 
Bipartisan Framework admittedly contains a substantive reform with 
this particular proposal, it creates a paradoxical and infeasible goal. 
3. Elements Three and Four— Deportation and Lack of 
Eligibility for Legal Status of Individuals with Serious 
Criminal Backgrounds and Those Who Pose a Threat to 
National Security 
Element three of the Bipartisan Framework, dealing with 
deportation, and element four, dealing with lack of eligibility for 
legal status, although bifurcated in the report, should be analyzed as 
a single element because under the INA, individuals adjudged 
ineligible for legal status in the United States are typically deemed 
deportable as well.90 Elements three and four of the Bipartisan 
Framework propose to make individuals who have serious criminal 
backgrounds or who pose a threat to the national security of the 
United States ineligible for legal status and subject to deportation.91 
 
          88 8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(1)(A) (2005). 
          89 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. 
          90 See 8 U.S.C. §1229(a) (2006). 
         91 See Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 2. 
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What is particularly striking about these proposals is that they imply 
that the law is currently silent or incapable of addressing the 
concerns underlying these elements. However, a current reading of 
the law regarding the grounds upon which a non-citizen can be 
deported from the United States reveals that this is not the case. 
Section 237(a)(2) of the INA currently lists various grounds for 
deportation, including a host of “serious crimes”, as well as some 
lesser crimes, such as multiple criminal convictions, commission of an 
aggravated felony, failure to register as a sex offender, controlled 
substances violations, crimes of domestic violence, and crimes 
relating to espionage, sabotage, treason, and sedition.92 Further, 
section 237(a)(4) of the INA 237(a)(4) lists national security-related 
grounds of deportation, such as espionage, sabotage, and any other 
criminal activity that endangers public safety or national security.93 
This section also makes deportable “any alien whose presence or 
activities in the United States .  .  . would have potentially serious 
adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States.”94 Thus, 
on these issues, the Bipartisan Framework does not propose 
substantive policy reform. On the contrary, the plan simply restates 
the current statutory approach. 
4. Element Five— Probationary Legal Status 
Requirements 
The Bipartisan Framework appears to propose a two-step process 
for unauthorized immigrants currently living in the United States to 
attain legal status. The first step would require such individuals to 
attain a type of probationary legal status referred to as “registered 
provisional immigrant” status.95 Presumably, it is the holders of this 
status who would be required to “go to the back of the line of 
prospective immigrants, pass an additional background check, pay 
taxes, learn English and civics, demonstrate a history of work in the 
United States, and current employment, among other requirements,” 
and only when the applicant satisfies these requirements may he or 
she attain lawful permanent resident status.96 Overall, this portion of 
 
          92 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2000). 
          93 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4). 
         94 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i). 
          95 See S.744 § 2101. 
          96 Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 2. 
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the Bipartisan Framework suggests a construct that mirrors the 
legalization requirements of IRCA and its regulations, which set forth 
requirements by which a person having lawful temporary resident 
status could adjust to permanent resident status.97 The following table 
highlights the similarities between IRCA and the Bipartisan 
Framework in obtaining legal status. 
  
 
          97 See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.3. 
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Table 1: Similarities between 1986 IRCA and  
2013 Bipartisan Framework 
IRCA 1986 Bipartisan Framework 2013 
Proposals 
Required proof that the applicant 
had not been convicted of any 
felony, or three or more 
misdemeanors.98 
Applicant must undergo 
additional background check.99 
Required applicant to 
demonstrate minimal 
understanding of ordinary 
English and a knowledge and 
understanding of the history and 
government of the United 
States.100 
Applicant must learn English 
and civics.101 
Required applicants to “stand in 
line.”102 
Applicants must go to the “back 
of the line of prospective 
immigrants.”103 
An applicant who had a 
consistent employment history 
which showed the ability to 
support himself or herself even 
though his or her income was 
below the poverty level was 
deemed not excludable.104 
Applicant must have a history of 
employment.105 
An applicant was not required to 
pay taxes. 
Applicant must pay taxes.106 
 
As shown in the above table, both the Bipartisan Framework and 
 
          98 8 C.F.R. § 245a.3(b)(3). 
    99 Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 2. 
         100 8 C.F.R. § 245a.3(b)(4)(i)(A). 
         101 Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 2. 
         102 8 C.F.R. § 245a.3(a)(1)(providing that an alien could not adjust to permanent 
residency until granted LTR status). 
          103 Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 2. 
           104 8 C.F.R. § 245a.3(g)(4)(iii). 
           105 Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 2. 
           106 Id. 
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IRCA require vetting of an applicant’s background to demonstrate 
that the applicant has not been convicted of any felony, or three or 
more misdemeanors. The Bipartisan Framework proposes that 
applicants must learn English and civics. Similarly, IRCA required 
applicants to demonstrate minimal understanding of ordinary 
English and a knowledge and understanding of the history and 
government of the United States. The employment history of an 
applicant is also considered under both the Bipartisan Framework 
and the IRCA. The Bipartisan Framework proposes that an applicant 
must have a history of employment. Under IRCA, applicants who 
could show a consistent employment history that demonstrated an 
ability to support themselves, even though their income was below 
the poverty level, were deemed not excludable as a public charge.107 
5. Element Six— Unlawfully Present Persons Must Go to 
the End of the Line and Wait 
While the IRCA and the Bipartisan Framework adhere to the 
idea of “standing in line,” they differ with respect to an applicant’s 
placement in line. The Bipartisan Framework adopts a conservative 
approach by proposing that unlawfully present aliens in the United 
States be required to go to the “end of the line” and wait before 
attaining lawful status.108 Unlawfully present aliens would “only 
receive a green card after every individual who is already waiting in 
line for a green card, at the time this legislation is enacted, has 
received their green card.”109 The requirement that unlawfully 
present aliens be forced to the end of the line is a testament to the 
Republican Party’s desire to avoid criticism that the proposal would 
be tantamount to amnesty.110 In a statement made regarding the 
Bipartisan Framework, Republican Senator John McCain said, “‘[w]e 
have got to show my constituents and our Republicans . . . this is not 
amnesty . . . This is a tough road to citizenship but we have got to give 
 
          107 Id. 
          108 Id. 
           109 Id. 
           110 Jordan Fabian, Why Republicans Must Break the “Amnesty” Stereotype for Immigration 
Reform, FUSION (Apr. 11, 2013, 10:53 AM), 
http://fusion.net/leadership/story/immigration-republicans-break-amnesty-
stereotype-12070. 
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[unlawfully-present aliens] the opportunity to do so.’”111 
Under the INA, there are numerical quotas for the number of 
immigrant visas that may be issued to individuals in a certain 
preference category seeking permanent resident status each year. 
The limit for family-sponsored immigrants is outlined in INA 
201(c)112 for employment-sponsored immigrants in INA 201(d)113 and 
for diversity immigrants in INA 201(e).114 When an immigrant visa 
category becomes oversubscribed, the excess petitions roll over to the 
next quota period and a waiting list (sometimes referred to as a “visa 
queue”) is created.115 Under INA 203(e)(1)116 family and employment-
based visas must be issued in the order in which the petitions were 
received, otherwise known as the “priority date.”117 Thus, family and 
employment-sponsored immigrants must already go to the end of the 
numerical line and wait.  For some applicants, particularly from 
countries like Mexico, the Philippines, and India, this can mean 
waiting as long as fifteen or more years until receiving a visa.118 
Although the Bipartisan Framework does not suggest a separate 
line, or preference category, for unlawfully present aliens seeking to 
attain lawful presence in the United Statesdoes not change the 
current numerical quota system currently in place. Presumably, 
applicants in this category will be subject to the same visa issuance 
 
          111 Reid Pillifant, Schumer: Immigration plan ‘is not amnesty in any sense of the word’, 
CAPITAL NEW YORK (Jan. 29, 2013), 
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2013/01/7416538/schumer-
immigration-plan-not-amnesty-any-sense-word. 
          112 See 8 U.S.C. §1151(a)(1). 
          113 See 8 U.S.C. §1151(a)(2). 
         114 See 8 U.S.C. §1151(a)(3). 




    116 8 U.S.C. §1153(e)(1). 
          117 THE OPERATION OF THE IMMIGRANT NUMERICAL CONTROL SYSTEM, BUREAU OF 
CONSULAR AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF STATE (2010), available at 
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Immigrant%20Visa%20Control%20Syste
m_operation%20of.pdf. 
          118 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, VISA BULL. NO. 65, VOL. 
9, IMMIGRANT NUMBERS FOR FEBRUARY 2014 (2014), available at 
http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/law-and-policy/bulletin/2014/visa-
bulletin-for-february-2014.html. 
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scheme set forth in INA 203(e)(1). A meaningful reform under the 
Bipartisan Framework would have been for Congress to make a 
drastic increase in the number of immigrant visas that can be issued 
annually, instead of simply capping the number of visas for this 
category of aliens just it did for the other categories of aliens. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This Article focused on a framework articulated by a bipartisan 
group of eight U.S. senators proposing a purportedly major reform of 
the U.S. immigration system. This proposal came on the heels of 
President Barack Obama’s inauguration to his second term of office 
and the President’s longing desire to overhaul the nation’s 
immigration system. The senators, in claiming that the U.S. 
immigration system is “broken,” offered a plan aimed at, among 
other things, creating an arduous pathway for individuals who are 
currently unlawfully present in the United States. The framework, 
introduced by the Senate as the Border Security, Economic 
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013, was 
passed by the Senate on June 27, 2013.119 However, the proposal has 
not yet been considered by the U.S. House of Representatives. 
This Article focused on one of the four “pillars” of the Bipartisan 
Framework that aimed at creating “a tough but fair path to 
citizenship for unauthorized immigrants currently living in the 
United States.”120 The goal of this Article was to explore whether, 
applying the literature on policy innovation and nondecision making, 
the policies proposed in each element of this pillar amounted to 
policy innovation or mere nondecision making. As used in this 
Article, policy innovation is the adoption of problem-solving 
approaches that depart from traditional legislative approaches to 
regulation of immigration. In light of the analysis above, this Article 
concludes that the plan to create a tough pathway to citizenship for 
unauthorized immigrants articulated in the Bipartisan Framework is 
not a policy innovation, but is instead a nondecision by Congress 
resulting from the contentious nature of immigration reform and the 
electoral stakes involved. 
 
 
          119 S. 744, 133th Cong. (2013-2014). 
         120 Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 1. 
